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Abstract 
Increasing the automation level of systems has led to more attention being paid to human control roles and 
the dependability of systems that comprise operators and machines. When humans build mental models of complex 
automated systems, they can be faced with problems regarding situation awareness. Moreover, these complex 
systems may lead to knowledge-based errors in situations where decision-making has to be performed. To cope with 
such situations, one may wish to consider advisory systems. An advisory system is a type of decision support system 
that tackles the complexity of systems with regard to human judgement for decision-making. This paper describes an 
approach to systems, advisory systems and their human use for safe operation. The intention is to initiate a future 
path for a formal description of systems in which an advisory system might play a role for their dependability. 
Keywords: Dependability, Decision Support Systems, Advisory Systems, Safety, Computer Based 
systems, human error. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The term “computer-based” is used to identify systems which include both computers and humans as 
essential players. Thus both nuclear reactor control systems and hospital information systems are likely 
to be computer-based whereas neither a Dickensian ledger system nor a simple thermostat in themselves 
deserve that classification. 
Computer-based systems can be used to influence some aspect of the physical world outside of the 
computer: an obvious case is controlling an aircraft but it could also be the choice and level of drugs 
administered to a patient. Because of the situations in which computer-based systems occur, the extent to 
which they are dependable is of concern. The term “dependability” is used to cover many desirable 
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properties including reliability, safety and security. There is a significant body of research on the 
development of dependable systems [1]. This paper sets out the challenge of people operating with 
computer-based systems and outlines a programme of research into increasing dependability by 
providing ways of reasoning about advisory systems. This paper also centres on safety as an aim for the 
dependability of an advisory system. To clarify what is meant by an advisory system, the roles of some 
other components of possible computer-based systems are discussed first. 
Three potential components of a computer-based system are human operators, control systems and 
the world [2]. But in some (often complex) situations, there is another role. Those computer systems that 
can enrich the view from both the world and the computer-based system and offer advice to the operator. 
There is a huge range of such advisory systems with chess playing systems and air traffic control systems 
being two examples whose differences appear as great as their similarities. Nor is it always clear that an 
advisory system can be separated from some proximate control system. The position taken in this paper 
however is that focussing on advisory systems helps distinguish particular failure modes that the 
development of computer-based systems must strive to avoid. For example, an advisory system which 
recommends drug prescriptions to a doctor might either offer bad advice which the doctor follows or 
offer good advice which the doctor ignores. Either situation can result in a failure of the overall 
computer-based system. The extent to which advice is seen as always correct, or often wrong, will 
influence an operator’s reaction but so might the presentation. More deeply, it is necessary to study 
questions such as the degree of similarity of the models (of reality) held by different system components. 
Section 2 introduces the concept of computer-based systems in order to set the context of an advisory 
system, section 3 remarks on the complexity of computer-based systems and human error. Section 4 
includes the role of an advisory system in computer-based systems. Section 5 explains human operator 
and advisory system roles. Section 6 examines scenarios that can result from the interaction of an 
advisory system and an operator. Section 7 raises questions about the limits of advisory systems and 
finally section 8 gives conclusions. 
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2. Computer-based systems 
As previously mentioned, a computer-based system could be comprised of: a world or reality as an 
intended process which needs to be executed, a human operator whose task is to control that world, and, 
in between the world and the reality, a control system (automated procedures1 inside computers which 
aim to control as well as to constrain the world into a safe envelope).  
Nowadays, more and more processes are complex tasks that are computer assisted. Computers 
consist of automated procedures that perform operations, which are quick, flexible, accurate and 
repeatable, and that may attempt to control processes in the world. Yet automation still presents a 
challenge in controlling processes. Many systems, in different ways and to a different degree of 
involvement, still demand human skills to carry out supervisory and decision-making tasks. 
3. Complexity of Systems and Human Error 
Computer systems are valuable tools for automation as well as for aiding operator supervision2. 
However, processes in the world are being devised for increasing complex tasks, and thus computer 
control often inherits this complexity. Complex systems may present problems for human understanding 
and thus they may be prone to human error. 
Rasmussen classified human behaviour as skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based behaviour 
[3], which in turn, set out categories of human error i.e. skill-based slips, rule-based mistakes and 
knowledge based mistakes [4]. Additionally, human behaviour is unreliable and error prone [5, 6]. 
However, despite human unreliability, humans have the quality to act to unpredicted situations, Fischoff 
stated that “part of the genius of people is their ability to see (and, hence respond to) situations in unique 
                                                     
1
 Automated procedures, automated systems and computer systems could be interchangeable. 
2
 Tasks such as diagnosis, control, design, instruction, interpretation, monitoring, planning, prediction, prescription, 
selection or simulation. 
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(and, hence unpredictable) ways” p. 83 [7]. Thus, Computers perform automatisms under pre-specified 
premises whereas people offer originality and creativity.  
However, when human operators are dealing with complex systems and they have to do real 
thinking, they may incur in knowledge-based mistakes [8]. A significant proportion of systems failures 
could be attributed to human operation and error, though many of these failures could also be tracked 
down to design faults in the system rather than human errors [9]. 
Humans build mental models of automated systems, a mental model is that model that operators and 
users of automated systems form of the way their system behaves and use that model to guide their 
interaction with the system [10]. However, the world and its processes and control mechanisms may be 
complex and as a result the interactions between operators, computers and the realities in the world may 
lead to human error and system failure. This has been pointed out by several authors. Rushby explains 
how faults between operators and automated systems (and their automated modes) sometimes arise as a 
result of a mismatch between the operator’s mental model and the automated system behaviour [11]. 
Sheridan [12] draws attention to the different models for human and machine systems and their mutual 
views of each other, on which decisions have to be taken. Leveson also mentions that while automation 
has eliminated some type of errors, it has also created potential for new types of error between models 
and operating modes [13, 14]. Subsequently, a complex process in the world plus a complex control may 
produce complex systems, where a mental model may face problems regarding situation awareness, and 
moreover lead to knowledge-based mistakes when decision-making has to be performed. 
So, complex systems lead to a picture of systems with complex interactions and tight couplings for a 
human operator. The complex interactions and tight couplings concept is taken from Perrow’s book [15]. 
Complex (or non-linear) interactions occur when units in the system link one or more parts, whose 
failure becomes a common mode failure across different parts of the system, so as to the operator the 
symptoms of failure will not lead directly to the causes, whereas a tightly coupled system request rapid 
responses to perturbations. These complex and tight systems might be the result of an evolution in 
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seeking to improve the efficiency of systems [15, 16], or additionally, they might be the result of 
unstructured or semi-structured problem domains which present uncertainty and fuzzyness. 
Therefore, operators build mental models of systems, and when the system is complex, these 
operators may strive with their mental model for situation awareness, and additionally, operators may 
strive in a knowledge-based level for prediction and decision-making. Fischoff mentions that “once, 
people have to do any real thinking, then the system becomes complex. In such cases the task of the 
engineer is to help operators to understand the system, rather than manage it as a part of it” p. 83 [7]. 
4. Advisory Systems 
To cope with the complexity of computer-based systems, one may wish to consider advisory 
systems. An advisory system is an interactive decision support system that provides help4 in the form of 
advice to a decision-maker operator in order to hold desired states (i.e. safe states) in the overall system. 
So, an advisory system aims to reduce uncertainty about which state of affairs exist, which state of 
affairs is in fact preferred, what courses of action are possible, and about the actual consequences of any 
course of action [7]. Advice thus becomes a prediction. So, an advisory system is a kind of feed-forward 
system which forecasts likely future.  
Thereby, advisory systems instantiate complex models of the reality i.e. an advisory system has a 
complex view of the reality in order to tackle uncertainty and enhance prediction, however, uncertainty 
and non-determinism may still pervade and come up in the advisory system model. Consequently, an 
advisory system may neither guarantee the completeness of a model nor the soundness of advice5.  
So, the advisory systems’ models are less reliable models of the reality and consequently they shall 
be opened to operator criticism and their advice shall be conditioned to operator acceptance. A good 
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 e.g. medical diagnosis advisories, flight control assistants, route planners, etc. 
5
 So, advisory systems may make mistakes of judgement in the advice, and thus they may not offer continuous and 
sound service (i.e. reliability). 
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practice is that advice should not be directly translated into operations/actions in the world. A human 
operator shall be responsible for the acceptance of advice into the world. Therefore an advisory system is 
an automated decision-maker that cannot automatically commit its decisions as they rely upon operator 
acceptance who becomes the final decision-maker. An advisory system becomes a supportive component 
of an operational system.  
Advisory systems are in the fields of expert systems and artificial intelligence (human cognitive 
science). However expert systems can be developed for two purposes: either to replace a human 
decision-maker or to support a human decision-maker. In the former case, we could regard the expert 
system as a part which is liaising within a complex control system and hence being a part of the control 
system. In the latter case, we could consider an expert system designed to obtain advice with the aim to 
support and improve decision-making effectiveness for human users. It is in this case that an expert 
system is regarded as an advisory system. 
According to the aforesaid, an advisory system is a passive element in the sense that an advisory 
system inspects the system and suggests alternative courses of action rather than directly participating in 
automating control. Therefore, the advisory system principal virtue is to assist users in decision-making 
tasks. Such assistance may still be classified as either passive consultants, when advisory systems 
provide help on demand e.g. medical diagnosis system, or active consultants, when advisory systems 
take control of the interaction with the user in order to give advice e.g. Microsoft Office Assistant [17]. 
Therefore, an advisory system aims to assist human decision-making, increasing the operator’s 
knowledge of the system as well as his/her awareness and improve the safety (i.e. desired states) of the 
overall system. An advisory system thus aims to convert those complex interactions of an operator into 
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linear6 interactions by helping the operator to structure and analyze that complexity as well as those tight 
couplings of an operator into loose couplings by providing anticipated responses. 
5. The Operator and the Advisory System 
Reasoning about advisory components requires that we understand their relationship with the 
operator and their actual interaction roles. Human operators are the decision-makers. Therefore, advisory 
systems’ advice acceptance depends on the operator. In Figure 1 we can see a classification of human-
machine interaction roles. In this figure, human operators hold decision-making between bullets 2 to 6. 
Hence, an advisory system would fall into these bullets8. 
 
Figure 1 Sheridan-Verplank taxonomy of human-machine interactions [12] 
One important aspect between an operator and an advisory system is their interaction and their 
mutual communication9. An advisory system may suggest feasible solution strategies available to a 
                                                     
6
 Non-complex. 
8
 Some examples can be seen in our everyday life, for instance a route and traffic guidance system in someone’s car 
(roles 2 or 3) or the Microsoft Office Assistant (roles 3 to 5). 
9
 User centred modelling, ergonomics, user interfaces (Intelligent interfaces, active and passive help systems, 
hypertext systems, intelligent information retrieval, natural language systems, intelligent tutoring systems, 
cooperative expert systems) and human-computer models. 
(1) Whole task done by human except for actual operation by machine; 
(2) Human asks computer to suggest options and selects from the option; 
(3) Computer suggests options to human; 
(4) Computer suggests options and proposes one of them; 
(5) Computer chooses an action and performs it if human approves; 
(6) Computer chooses an action and performs it unless human disapproves; 
(7) Computer chooses an action, performs it, and informs human; and 
(8) Computer does everything autonomously. 
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decision-maker. But the advisory system may have to add explanations about the likely consequences or 
the rationales of a decision, which either of them or both could be decisive for the operator acceptance of 
the advice (i.e. user acceptance might depend upon his/her evaluation process of the advice10). That 
advice which deals with great uncertainty, the advisory system strength will rely on demonstrating its 
line of reasoning by offering a mechanism to validate or verify its advice.  
In such processes of rationalizing advice, advisory systems facilitate human users to obtain second 
opinions or answers to “what if” questions. So, an advisory system also becomes a learning and training 
tool for the operator. 
However, an operator may behave in different ways in front of an advisory system and have different 
attitudes. The operator places an amount of reliance on the advisory system. So an operator may either 
accept or reject advice, either on a knowledge level basis, that is, validating and verifying the advice, or, 
on the contrary, on an uncritical basis. Thereby, operator and advisory interactions may open up new 
faults due to the operator uncritical acceptance of the predictions from the advisory system. So, an 
operator could behave with overconfidence or underconfidence towards an advisory system [18, 19]. 
6. The Operator and the Advisory System Interaction 
The discussion here is aimed at depicting the taxonomy between an advisory system and an operator 
mental model. A computer-based system may consist of a world or reality, a control system, an advisory 
system, and a human operator. In this section, we will only consider an operator model and an advisory 
system model, whereas the world or reality and the control system are replaced by a single referential 
model which dictates either safe states or failure. So, we have a reality model, an operator model and an 
advisory model. Each model comprises states and transitions11. Before moving on, the concepts of state, 
transitions and safety will be briefly outlined. A state is all the accessible values in a model. A transition 
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 e.g. in a medical diagnosis that has been computer generated, the doctor must understand, and thus verify and 
validate any computer generated diagnosis. 
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defines a change from an initial state to a final state (i.e. operation execution). Taking into account safety 
with regard to states, a safe state is a desired (intended) state. Taking into account safety on transitions, 
we are interested in the liveness property of transitions, those transitions that move to safe states. 
Hence, each model consists of states and transitions. Decision making is about predicting future 
states. Transitions are the predictions e.g. a lively transition is a prediction to a safe state. Finally, 
decision-making consists in selecting a transition either from the advisory model or from the operator 
model. But selecting a transition (i.e. decision-making) is an option only available for the operator 
model. 
1
2
3
4
Operator Mental 
Model’s operations
Advisory Model 
(advice consists of 
recommended 
operations)
Golden subset of 
operations that upholds 
safety in the real world
(referential model)
a
b
(outside the 
discontinuous circle) 
operations that trigger 
incidents or accidents
 
Figure 2 Human operator and advisory system cases 
Figure 2 shows the operator model (i.e. operator mental model) and the advisory model, plus that 
subset of the world (discontinuous circle) whose states and operations hold safety and liveness; this 
subset of the world is somehow the ideally golden model which becomes our reference model for safe 
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states and lively operations. States outside the golden model either trigger incidents or accidents12. Both 
the operator model and the advisory model aim to be a reflection of this golden model. The advisory 
model expresses advice i.e. recommended operations (predictions). The human operator, as a decision-
maker, is ultimately responsible for selecting an operation either from the advisory model or from the 
operator model itself. The operations inside the operator model are worked out on a knowledge-based 
basis. Thus, anything outside the operator model is outside the mental model and knowledge awareness 
of the operator. Yet the operator can select those operations outside his/her model, when for instance the 
operator decides to carry out uncritically an operation from the advisory model. 
In case 1, the operator approves the advisory system’s advice. So, the operator mental model is in 
accordance with the advice issued by the advisory system. Both the human mental model and the 
advisory model have reflected an operation that holds the property of liveness in the reality (i.e. 
operation inside the golden model), hence the final state will be safe. 
In case 2, the operator approves the advisory system’s advice, however, neither the operator model 
nor the advisory system’s advice has resolved a liveness operation i.e. the operator approves bad advice, 
hence the final state will be unsafe. Both the operator and the advisory system ignore some part of the 
reality. So, the cause of this fault could be a common fault assumption of the reality by both the human 
model and the advisory model. 
In case 3, the operator either rejects any advice coming out from the advisory or the advisory does 
not issue advice. In any case, the human operator makes a prediction and takes a decision from his own 
pool of operations, which is a liveness operation, hence safe. In the case in which the advisory does not 
issue advice, the operator had no other option rather than select one operation based on his/her own 
prediction. In the case in which the human operator rejects the advice, it does not mean that the advice 
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 The concept of incident and accident is taken from [15], an “accident” is an event that is unintended, unfortunate, 
damages people or objects, affects the functioning of the system of interest, and is non-trivial, whereas an 
“incident” may require shutdown or reduce output operation of the system as a whole. 
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issued was good or bad, nor recognised by the operator as good or bad, but the operator had confidence 
(or knowledge) on his/her prediction. So, the operator recognises good advice or bad advice, yet he/she 
decides to choose an operation based on his/her knowledge and predictions. 
In case 4, the operator again takes a decision from his own pool of operations; again in this situation 
the human operator either rejects advice or the advisory system does not issue advice. This case is 
similar to case 3 however, the human operator selects an operation which is not liveness; hence he is 
performing an unsafe operation. 
Regions a and b hold those operations of the advisory system which either are not recognised as 
good or bad by the human operator or are uncritically rejected. In region a, the advisory system holds 
good advice which has been rejected by the human operator. The cause could be either a fault in the 
human operator who fails to understand the advice or a fault in the advisory system to present adequately 
the advice which does not allow the operator to understand it. In region b, the advisory system holds bad 
advice. This advice is neither recognised as good nor bad by the operator. 
Although advice in regions a and b is outside the human mental model, the operator may still select 
such advice when she/he uncritically accepts such advice. 
Finally, note that if the human operator increases expertise over the system, as a result, region 1 and 
3 might be enlarged and the regions a, b and 2 might be reduced. Furthermore, if the operator confidence 
on his/her predictions increases then region 1 might also be reduced, consequently, it would diminish the 
usefulness of the advisory system. Alternatively, when operator expertise decreases and the use of the 
advisory falls entirely in region a, then the advisory system becomes a fully autonomic control system. 
This could be the result of people relying on the advisory system, thus bypassing advice uncritically to 
control and the world. 
7. Limits of Advisory Systems 
This section identifies the limits of advisory systems.  
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The first concerns the advisory system ability to communicate advice to the operator (section 5). 
Depending on the operator knowledge of the system, and depending on the advisory system skills to 
present adequately advice, the human operator might present his/her limits in recognizing bad as well as 
good advice. 
Secondly, as said in section 4, the model of an advisory system is enlarged to have a better view of 
the world, so advisory systems try to approach more complete models of the reality, as a result, in this 
approach to completeness, uncertainty and unreliability may upraise in the advisory system. Hence an 
advisory system may set limits on reliability (continuity of service in advice giving), credibility 
(difficulty to hold a justified theory), accuracy (relevant advice), practicability (decision-making 
feasibility) and user acceptability (advice clarity i.e. value judgements are clear) [20]. Hence, advisory 
systems are setting out limits on user’s confidence and consequently on the user’s view of advice 
trustworthiness. 
Finally, the limit of an advisory system concerns responsibility. The use of advisory computer 
systems when responsible decisions have to be made raises a question concerning to what extent an user 
might expect to override a computer recommendation (advice) if there is a reason to believe that the 
computer may be in error. Consequently, someone may become obliged to at least consider a computer’s 
advice; but what if someone believes that the computer is wrong when it is not? If there is a difference of 
opinion that cannot be resolved, should someone follow his own judgement or the computer’s advice? 
[21]. 
8. Conclusions 
Advisory systems aim to enhance safety in systems by giving advice. They have a complex model of 
the world and its environment, however such models may present uncertainty consequently they are less 
reliable models of the reality. So, advisory systems do not directly translate advice into actions in the 
world (human acceptance is required first). Thus, they are related to the assistance of a human operator. 
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However, a human operator may be led into faults either by ignoring or rejecting good advice, or on the 
contrary, by accepting bad advice. The extent of these faults and their possible failures will depend on 
the dependability of the advice upon the system. 
Rather than constructing systems to behave opaquely to humans, advisory systems facilitate human 
operator tasks. As a result they may force a discussion for human oriented design of systems. Therefore, 
an advisory system may induce a design to improve the operator knowledge of a system and thus his/her 
mental model, so an advisory system refers and aids human tasks. As Rasmussen stated a “control task 
must be described in terms referring to human mental functions rather than system requirements” p. 265 
[3]. 
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